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Automatic Processes in Aggression: Conceptual and Assessment Issues 
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This editorial to the special section “Automatic Processes in Aggression: Conceptual and Assessment Issues” 
introduces major research lines, all of which culminate in recent advances in the measurement of automatic 
components in aggressive behavior. Researchers of almost all psychological disciplines have stressed increasingly the 
importance of automatic components to gain a comprehensive psychological understanding of human behavior. This is 
reﬂected in current dual-process theories according to which both controlled processes and rather automatic processes 
elicit behavior in a synergistic or antagonistic way. As a consequence, complementing self-reports (assumed to assess 
predominantly controlled processes) by the use of implicit measures (assumed to assess predominantly automatic 
processes) has become common practice in various domains. We familiarize the reader with the three contributions 
that illuminate how such a distinction can further our understanding of human aggression. At the same time, it 
becomes evident that there is a long way that method-oriented researchers need to go before we can fully comprehend 
how to best measure automatic processes in aggression. We see the present special section as an invigorating call to 
contribute to this endeavor. Aggr. Behav. 41:44–50 2015. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
Keywords: automatic processes; implicit measures; implicit association; aggression; aggressiveness 
INTRODUCTION 
When Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) distinguished between automatic and controlled information processing, they 
opened the gates for what has become one of the most important distinctions in contemporary psychology. Although 
their initial conception of automaticity and control was rather mutually exclusive (with the presence of deliberate and 
controlled processes more or less ruling out automatic processes), their seminal work was the starting point of the 
study and understanding of automatic and controlled processes from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In 
what follows, we will argue that the necessity to incorporate automatic processes in aggression theories research has 
been recognized quite some time ago. However, the empirical evidence in this regard is still scarce – as pointed out by 
several researchers not too long ago (e.g., Berkowitz, 2008; Richetin, Richardson, & Mason, 2010; Richetin & 
Richardson, 2008; Todorov & Bargh, 2002). With the present special section, we aim at ﬁlling this void and at 
inspiring further research. Three contributions open a fascinating view of the progress made in the last few years, 
speciﬁcally on how to predict aggressive urges that seem to defy our control, with the help of implicit measures. 
The Dual-Process Perspective 
All contributions in this special section derive their theoretical underpinnings from theories that distinguish between 
spontaneous (automatic) and reﬂective (controlled) information processing on the way to (aggressive) behavior. 
Current dual-process theories 
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(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2003, 2004) have expanded Shiffrin and Schneider’s views, suggesting that automatic and 
controlled processes may run in parallel, with various possible interactions between them (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). For instance, according to the comprehensive Reﬂective-Impulsive Model (RIM; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), 
human behavior is governed by two information processing systems, the impulsive system and the reﬂective system. 
Both have very different properties but can activate behavioral schemas in a synergistic or antagonistic way along a 
common ﬁnal pathway. 
The impulsive system relies on the operation of an associative network in memory. Upon perceptual or imaginative 
input, activation is thought to spread through the network as fast as the associative strengths between the involved 
nodes allow. The idea of spreading activation is a metaphor for a process that occurs unintentionally upon cue-impact, 
fast and efﬁciently so, without requiring attentional resources and awareness, and more often than not in an 
unstoppable, uncontrollable fashion – in short, this process is assumed to run automatically (Bargh, 1994). Unlike the 
impulsive system, the reﬂective system is conceptualized as handling complex computations, attaching truth values to 
statements, engaging in syllogistic reasoning, and making deliberate decisions about future actions. It crucially 
depends on active attention allocation, sufﬁcient time, and cognitive resources. Motivational and emotional inﬂuences 
on behavior are accounted for by postulating that they temporarily or chronically activate speciﬁc knowledge 
structures and behavior scripts. 
Along with the notion that automatic processes are as important as are controlled processes for understanding human 
information processing and behavior, the question arose how to assess automatic and controlled processes. If the goal 
is behavioral prediction at the individual level, the measurement outcome has to reliably reﬂect a trait-like disposition. 
Dozens of measures have been developed, often employed in experimental settings, and with each single measure 
came the hope of reliably assessing inter-individual differences in automatic processes too (for an overview, see 
Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). 
Notwithstanding research that shows that no measurement outcome can be regarded as process-pure (e.g., Sherman, 
2009; Klauer, 2014), there is strong convergence on the idea that self-reports mostly assess controlled, deliberative 
processes of the reﬂective system, whereas so-called implicit measures are predominantly based on automatic, 
spontaneous and associative processes residing in the impulsive system (e.g., Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002). 
Implicit measures, in contrast to self-reports, do not directly ask individuals for their attitudes or self-concepts. Instead, 
inter-individual differences in participants’ attitudes or self-concepts indirectly translate to the participants’ 
performance in speciﬁc tasks. Unlike self-reports, indirect measures require bigger inferential leaps from performance 
outcomes (e.g., response latencies or error rates) of speciﬁc measurement procedures (e.g., stimulus sorting task) to the 
construct of interest (e.g., aggressive disposition). So the individual differences in task performance are taken to reﬂect 
differences in the cognitive processes underlying the construct of interest. For instance, a highly prominent implicit 
measure, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is essentially a doubled-
barreled stimulus sorting procedure. To the extent that such measurement procedures conceal what exactly is being 
measured, so that the measure works rather independently from a test-taker’s intention, to the extent that they use very 
fast and efﬁcient cognitive operations, but offer only reduced means to distort the measurement process, these 
measures are typically addressed as implicit measures. As such they are assumed to capture predominantly automatic 
cognitive processes (Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). 
Indeed, empirical research in the past two decades has supported the view that both automatic processes (as mostly 
assessed via implicit measures) and controlled processes (as mostly assessed via self-report measures) exert additive 
and interactive inﬂuences on behavior (e.g., Friese, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008; Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 
2010). It was shown that cognitive processes can be automatically driven by external cues, and that they reliably lead 
to the execution of human behavior (e.g., Bargh, 1994). Crucially, individuals are often not even aware of this 
happening until they ﬁnd themselves having violated their own deliberate behavioral standards. In other words, 
individuals often lack the capacity to accurately introspect and report accordingly on the causes underlying their 
behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), either because they are unaware of these causes, or because the cognitive 
processes begin and vanish too quickly to be identiﬁed. Besides these introspective limits, self-report data have been 
shown to be subject to self-presentation, impression management, and socially desirable responding (e.g., Paulhus, 
1984). In line with the dual-process perspective, complementing self-reports by the use of implicit measures has 
therefore started to become common practice in various domains, including the following: clinical psychology (e.g., 
anxiety, phobias; Roefs et al., 2011); social psychology (e.g., intergroup attitudes and contact; Greenwald, Poehlman, 
Uhlman, & 
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Banaji, 2009); differential psychology (e.g., Big Five; Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009; Schmukle, Back, & Egloff, 
2008); and everyday behavior (e.g., eating, drinking; Friese & Hofmann, 2009). 
In the domain of aggression, with few notable exceptions, a comparable treatment of assessing automatic processes 
in the sense of trait-like dispositions by implicit measures has largely been neglected (Berkowitz, 2008; Richetin & 
Richardson, 2008; Todorov & Bargh, 2002). This is surprising because from an applied perspective there is a need to 
improve the quality of diagnostic tools, for instance, in psychiatric and forensic contexts, in which individuals might 
not be willing or not be able to respond truthfully in self-report measures. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, 
in several popular models of aggression (e.g., the General Aggression Model, Anderson & Bushman, 2002; see also 
Crick & Dodge, 1994; Huesmann, 1997, 1998; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010) it is proposed that automatic cognitive 
processes are central for the formation of aggressive behavior. By acknowledging the interplay of both automatic and 
controlled processes in aggression, the dual-process perspective has been stressed in aggression models early on, partly 
even before the development of generic dual-process models that attracted considerable attention in various 
psychological domains. 
Automatic Processes in Aggression 
According to the General Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002), aggressive behavior is 
predominantly an outcome of the spontaneous appraisal of social situations, which evoke speciﬁc cognitions, affective 
reactions, and arousal. Only if the result of the immediate appraisal is unsatisfactory and only if there are sufﬁcient 
cognitive, motivational, and external resources (e.g., time to reﬂect), can a more complex re-appraisal take place and 
override any activated aggressive urges, resulting in the implementation of a rather thoughtful, possibly less aggressive 
action. This aspect of the GAM converges with the more recent dual-process accounts of human information 
processing (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; see also Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). It has to 
be noted, though, that the GAM is an example for default-interventionist models, whereas dual-process models often 
postulate the parallel effectiveness of two distinct types of information, or the operation of two distinct systems of 
information processing. It nevertheless appears plausible that implicit measures have the power to capture the 
automatic processes underlying the immediate appraisal of a given situation as hostile, an appraisal that may result in 
an individual’s aggressive behavior. 
Other models of aggression such as the Cognitive Neoassociation Theory (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; see also the models 
by Crick & Dodge, 1994; Huesmann, 1997, 1998) or the more recent Integrative Cognitive Model of Trait Anger and 
Reactive Aggression (ICM; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008, 2010) stress the cognitive basis of aggression, too. Hence, 
several researchers converge—although to different degrees—on the idea of a social information processing account of 
aggression. This suggests an assessment approach going beyond self-report measures. 
Speciﬁcally, according to the GAM, aggressive individuals differ from non-aggressive individuals by having more 
elaborated aggressive knowledge structures, for instance, stronger mental representations of the self as aggressive, 
more accessible scripts of aggressive behavior, and more positive attitudes toward aggressive behavior than non-
aggressive individuals (Bushman, 1996). Yet the GAM not only incorporates personality-driven, but also situation-
speciﬁc processes. It accounts for situational cues known to elicit aggression (e.g., provocation) by considering them 
as primes that, in turn, activate trait-like cognitive schemas related to anger, arousal, hostility, and eventually 
aggressive behavior. At the intersection, situation-factors may condense into personality. Being frequently exposed to 
violent situations (e.g., domestic or media violence) and activating aggressive behavioral scripts repeatedly (e.g., by 
engaging in physical ﬁghts or playing violent video games) raise the likelihood that hostile thoughts, schemata, and 
behavioral scripts become chronically highly available, thus nourishing trait aggressiveness. The situation-speciﬁc 
activation of aggression-related thoughts, emotions, and behaviors increases the likelihood that these aggression-
related knowledge structures get activated in the future (Bushman, 1996, 1998). 
Capturing these aggression-related knowledge structures thus appears to be a promising avenue for the prediction of 
aggressive behavior, and according to recent advances, implicit measures are particularly suited for this goal. To be 
clear, by stressing the importance of an assessment approach beyond mere self-report, we refer to measures that meet 
the psychometric requirements for assessing inter-individual differences in trait-like dispositions of aggression-related 
automatic processes. We do not refer to the numerous studies that used, for instance, reading reaction time tasks, 
lexical decision tasks, or other measures of attention bias and perception processes as dependent variables after 
experimental manipulations (e.g., Anderson and Dill, 2000). Of course, many of these same types of tasks—sufﬁcient 
reliability provided—can be used to assess automatic inter-individual differences in non-experimental contexts.  
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Indeed, the potential of implicit measures to tap dispositional automatic processes underlying aggression is not fully 
illuminated yet. The theoretical claims emphasizing the importance of automatic processes in aggression are not yet 
backed up by empirical evidence (e.g., Berkowitz, 2008). Open questions are, for instance: How can we reliably assess 
the trait-like automatic processes underlying aggression? How much does the assessment of automatic processes in 
aggression add to controlled processes as measured by self-reports? Are there factors moderating the impact of 
automatic versus controlled processes on the execution of aggressive behavior? What are the main chances and 
challenges in research on automatic processes in aggression? 
The Special Section 
The main goal of the special section is to inspire a stronger focus on automatic processes in aggression. Implicit 
measures may expand our understanding of the automatic components of aggression and thereby inﬂuence the 
theoretical models we adopt, or the research designs we employ, to investigate aggressive urges and outbursts. 
Three articles in this special section are devoted to aggressiveness as part of the self-concept as commonly found in 
personality-psychological approaches. They are united by using variants of one of the most popular implicit measures, 
the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). The Aggressiveness-IAT (Agg-IAT) is designed to assess associative processes that 
are relevant for the self-concept of aggressiveness, in other words the number and strengths of memory associations 
between mental representations related to the self and aggressive scripts. The strength of these associations are mostly 
based on the frequency of co-activation of the respective memory nodes, so they should not only mirror previous 
experiences but also qualify as predictors of future aggressive behavior. Whereas the ﬁrst two articles explore the 
speciﬁc utility of the Agg-IAT as a trait-like predictor of individual differences in aggressive behavior, the third 
contribution widens the trait perspective by suggesting that there are other stable inter-individual differences in 
automatic processes not based on spontaneous self-aggressive associations, but rather on differences in attentional 
biases. 
More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst article by Banse, Messer, & Fischer (2014) presents a comprehensive set of four studies 
investigating the psychometric properties of the Agg-IAT. Their results consistently indicate that the Agg-IAT has its 
merits in predicting aggressive behavior over and above common self-report measures of aggressiveness. The authors 
theoretically postulate, and empirically demonstrate, incremental validity when adding implicit measures to the set of 
predictors of aggressive behavior. Banse and colleagues also provide ﬁrst evidence for the utility of the Agg-IAT as a 
measure of trait-aggressiveness. 
In the second article, Lemmer, Gollwitzer, & Banse (2014) scrutinize to what extent the Agg-IAT reliably captures 
stable trait variance or occasion-speciﬁc variance. Only rarely has anyone inspected whether IATs contain sufﬁcient 
trait variance to qualify for long-term predictions, or whether they reﬂect mostly occasion-speciﬁc variance on the 
basis of a participant’s current mental state of recently activated (here: aggressive) concepts. Using a large-scale study 
on a longitudinal panel of children and adolescents, the authors show that the Agg-IAT reﬂects trait- and state-speciﬁc 
variance at the same time, and that the trait-speciﬁc variance shows promising signs of convergent and discriminant 
validity for aggression-related indicators. This pattern conﬁrms that researchers can use the Agg-IAT as a measure of 
trait-aggressiveness, but at the same time the Agg-IAT reﬂects situational inﬂuences too. This opens a window for 
aggression researchers who wish to objectively assess short-term experimental effects on participants’ aggressive 
dispositions in the lab (e.g., Bluemke, Friedrich, & Zumbach, 2010). 
In the third article, Brugman et al. (2014) use a single-category variant of the Agg-IAT to assess the self-concept of 
aggressiveness. They remind us of a whole range of implicit measures. None of them can assume an exclusive role to 
automatic processes in aggression. This contribution widens the methodological repertoire, by showing that the 
Emotional Stroop task can predict aggressive behavior too. Different from self-aggressive associations, it reﬂects inter-
individual differences in attentional bias for aggressive cues. Brugman and colleagues also observed a dissociation 
when predicting reactive and proactive aggression by the two types of implicit measures. This ﬁnding bolsters the 
debated, yet theoretically important distinction between reactive and proactive aggression, both of which were 
demonstrated simultaneously in a noise-blast task. Apart from clarifying the theoretical concepts, this ﬁnding also 
indicates that attention to different kinds of implicit measures is warranted. 
Future Research 
Based on the current empirical evidence, we envision several fruitful avenues for future research on automatic 
processes in aggression in conjunction with implicit measures. First, although it remains an unattainable ideal, the 
quest for “the best” implicit measure is far from over. Most researchers currently prefer the IAT, typically using 
measures based on the self-concept. Yet there are many other implicit measurement procedures that have 
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not been applied in the domain of aggression, and whose relevance is untested (for an overview see Gawronski & 
Houwer, 2014). Even when sticking with one family of implicit measures, such as the IAT, many procedural aspects 
have not been explored with regard to their impact on measurement validity. As a consequence, researchers are 
constantly at risk of underestimating the importance of automatic components in aggressive behavior for purely 
methodological reasons. For instance, some authors (e.g., Banse et al., 2014; Bluemke & Friese, 2012) have pinpointed 
several stimulus selections against each other, but other procedural aspects, such as the presence versus absence of the 
IAT comparison category (“other”), may have an unwarranted impact on the quality of measurement too (Karpinski, 
2004; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; see also Brugman et al., 2014). 
Once one crosses variants of implicit measures with one’s constructs of interest, the number of explorations 
increases rapidly. Although we do not expect an answer, or speciﬁc solution, that could rigidly bind all researchers, we 
do hope for a clearer picture as to why some measures work better than others in speciﬁc situations. 
Second, we expect that parameters reﬂecting automatic information processing within the measurement procedures 
will be isolated gradually by using mathematical modeling approaches. The currently predominant algorithms for 
analyzing implicit measures confound various cognitive inﬂuences, some of which do not reﬂect automatic or 
associative processes. One future goal will be to identify parameters that are as process-pure as possible. For instance, 
the QUAD model (see Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005) estimates parameters for the 
inﬂuence that associations between target and attribute categories have on the task performance (automatic process); 
yet it also estimates one parameter for the ability to overcome biased responses subsequent to the activation of 
automatic associations (controlled process). Competing multinomial models exist that, like the QUAD model, are 
based on accuracy rates but are parameterized differently from the QUAD model. The ABC model (Stahl & Degner, 
2007), the TRIP model (Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 2011), and the ReAL model (Meissner & Rothermund, 2013) 
represent some highly relevant competitors in the challenge for assessing co-occurring automatic and controlled 
processes in implicit measures. Another promising road is the use of diffusion models that incorporate the information 
gained from response accuracy distributions and simultaneously from response latency distributions (Ratcliff, 1978; 
for an application to the IAT, see Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; for an application to priming 
procedures, see Voss, Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2013). 
Regardless of the expected progress in the ﬁeld of modeling, we caution against identifying speciﬁc parameters from 
cognitive models with automaticity as such. Just as past research—prematurely—equated implicit measurement 
outcomes with various aspects of automaticity (regarding unaware, efﬁcient, unintentional, uncontrollable processes), 
we fear that the same “hype” might occur with parameters derived from computational models of cognitive processes. 
Not only does most of the evidence favor a componential view of automaticity anyway (De Houwer et al., 2009), but 
for each feature and for every measurement procedure speciﬁc evidence on the automaticity assumption is required. 
Just because a particular type of measurement outcome of a speciﬁc implicit measure—alternatively an estimated 
process parameter—has demonstrated certain features of automaticity in the past, does not mean that the same features 
will generalize to other domains, say aggression. Also, any such evidence does not imply that other untested features 
of automaticity hold for a particular measure, and they certainly do not generalize to different types of implicit 
measures by default. 
Third, we expect to see more and more research on the prediction of automatic components in aggressive behavior 
with a focus on inter-individual differences. Such research may involve situational or intrapersonal moderating 
variables that modulate when exactly the utility of an implicit measure exceeds that of a self-report measure (e.g., in 
the presence of high anger, low trait self-control, or low executive control). It seems only natural that “hot” cognition 
predisposes some individuals more than others to reactively retaliate, so that some implicit measures may be suitable 
to speciﬁcally predict reactive aggression. Yet, it is not at all unlikely that implicit measures allow a nuanced view on 
proactive aggression too (as found by Brugman et al., 2014). In fact, the case can be made that some people have 
aggressive urges that seem to come out of the blue and predispose them to aggress spontaneously and proactively 
without any triggers (see, e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2012, Exp. 3). As of yet, our limited knowledge in this area 
indicates that science has just set a foot onto the path of automatic and controlled components in the generation of 
(reactive vs. proactive) aggressive behavior. 
To summarize, if the present special section is well-received, we expect to see an increase in research activities that 
complement the picture on human aggression by invoking implicit measures. We expect more and more aggression 
researchers to look closer at what exactly can be considered the automatic processes underlying implicit measures and 
how the biggest share of meaningful information can be obtained from such methods, potentially shifting what counts 
as state-of-the- 
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art techniques. If our efforts instigate future investigations on how any antisocial consequences of automatic 
components underlying human aggression can be prevented or changed, we will be more than happy to have worked 
towards this goal. 
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